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0Abstract: This paper examines the incidence and welfare costs of inﬂation in the presence
ofﬁnancial market f rictions and home production. The results suggest that ﬁnancing
constraints on ﬁrms’ working capital expenditures signiﬁcantly increase the welfare costs
relative to the standard Cooley-Hansen (1989) cash-in-advance framework. These costs
are reduced, but remain above those computed by Cooley and Hansen, when a ﬁnancial
intermediary is introduced that engages in asset transformation by creating liquid, interest-
bearing deposit accounts and uses the proceeds to ﬁnance working capital loans to ﬁrms.
Explicitly modeling home production activities tends to exacerbate the distortions that
inﬂation induces in employment and market output to a considerable degree, and suggests
that the welfare costs of anticipated inﬂation may be substantially higher than previous
estimates. Sensitivity analysis indicates that the magnitude ofthe market response to
inﬂation and the attendant welfare costs of inﬂation depend strongly on the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor in home production, and to a much lesser degree on
the elasticity ofsubstitution between home and market consumption. When households
must also ﬁnance their gross investment in home capital by borrowing from the ﬁnancial
intermediary, home production is indirectly taxed by inﬂation. As a result ofthis credit
friction, resources thus tend to move back into the market, thereby mitigating the adverse
eﬀects of inﬂation on employment and output, while further increasing the welfare losses.
[Keywords: Inﬂation, home production, ﬁnancial intermediation; EL Codes: E44, E52]
1I. Introduction
Early eﬀorts to examine the incidence ofanticipated inﬂation taxes in monetary general
equilibrium models concluded that under moderate inﬂations these taxes have signiﬁcant,
but modest eﬀects on steady-state employment and output and hence on welfare. Money
is assumed to be valued as a medium ofexchange and enters the models via a cash-in-
advance constraint on consumption.1 The mechanism that operates in these models is
that inﬂation taxes consumption expenditures and hence the beneﬁts to the household of
market activity. As a consequence, this tax reduces consumption and distorts households’
resource allocations whereby they withdraw labor services in order to increase leisure, and
thus oﬀset somewhat the utility loss associated with lower consumption. The standard
references in this literature are to Cooley and Hansen (1989,1991), who ﬁnd, for example
(Table 2, 1989), that an increase in inﬂation from zero to ten percent reduces steady-state
employment by 2.3 percent, reduces steady-state output by 2.4 percent, and lowers welfare
by 0.376 percent, where the welfare loss is measured as the percent increase in steady-
state consumption under a ten percent inﬂation rate that would be required to make the
household indiﬀerent between the two inﬂation regimes.2
The welfare losses from anticipated inﬂation can be substantially larger than those
measured by Cooley and Hansen ifinﬂation also distorts the required return on capital or
1 Under certain conditions, cash-in-advance on consumption and money-in-the-utility
function models are interchangeable.
2 There is a substantial literature that has emerged on the welfare costs of inﬂation in
an endogenous growth context. In a Lucas (1988)-Uzawa (1965) model, Gomme (1993)
ﬁnds the welfare eﬀects of inﬂation taxes on consumption to be very small when comparing
balanced growth paths. Einarsson and Marquis (1999) ﬁnd that the transitional dynamics
enhance the beneﬁts ofdisinﬂation in this model as households reduce employment in
order to build up their human capital stock, while the attendant decline in output in the
short run is absorbed by lower physical capital investment, thus insulating consumption to
some extent. In a Romer (1990) style model with technology spillovers into the payment
system, Marquis and Reﬀett (1994) ﬁnd much larger welfare costs of inﬂation as households
allocate excessive resources to the payment system at the expense ofoutput. Ireland (1994)
ﬁnds a similar overinvestment in “ﬁnancial capital” in an AK-model. Other papers in this
literature, not all of which explicitly compute welfare costs, but rather attempt to identify
eﬀects ofinﬂation on growth, include Marquis and Reﬀett (1992,1995), Wang and Yip
(1992), DeGregorio (1993), who also provides some cross-country empirical evidence on
the negative correlation between growth and inﬂation, and Chang and Lai (2000).
1labor services. This distortion can occur ifﬁrms are required to ﬁnance their working capi-
tal expenses with short-term nominal debt that must be repaid with current sales revenues.
In this case, higher nominal interest rates increase the required productivity ofcapital and
labor and thereby reduce ﬁrms’ factor demands.3 H o w e v e r ,t h en a t u r eo ft h ep a y m e n t
system can also aﬀect those costs. If the borrowed funds arise from intermediated loans,
where a portion ofthe f unds are supplied to ﬁnancial intermediaries by households, say, in
return for interest-bearing deposit accounts with high liquidity value, then an increase in
inﬂation would cause households to shif t the composition oftheir media ofexchange away
from currency and toward bank deposits to insulate themselves partially from inﬂation
with the interest income that they receive on deposits. As a consequence, ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries can reduce the welfare costs of inﬂation by providing valued liquidity services in
exchange for deposit funds. [see Marquis (1999)].
In addition to examining the above ﬁnancial market frictions, this paper introduces
home production as in Benabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991) and Greenwood and Her-
cowitz (1991). Those models give a somewhat symmetric treatment to economic activity
at home and in the market. At home, time and “home capital” are used to produce
“home consumption” from which households derive utility. While home consumption is
unmeasured, data exist to construct time series for the factors of home production. In
particular, home capital consists ofthe stocks ofdurable consumption goods and housing,
which U.S. data indicate are slightly larger in value than market capital, where the latter
is measured as the stocks ofproducer durables, structures, and inventories. Diary data are
available, see, e.g. Juster and Staﬀord (1991), to approximate the allocation ofnonmarket
time between homework and leisure. Accounting for the additional margins of adjustment
available to the household in the home production setting is shown to eﬀect signiﬁcantly
the incidence ofinﬂation on market activities, and on the welf are costs ofinﬂation.
In the presence ofhome production, the distortions described above cause households
to shift resources out of the market sector and into the home sector. Even though home
3 It is noteworthy that a model with this ﬁnancing constraint and an inelastic labor
supply is an isomorphism ofthe “cash-in-advance on capital” model ofStockman (1981),
and in that sense can be seen as a rationalization ofhis cash constraint on gross investment.
2production is not completely insulated from inﬂation taxes, since time must be allocated
to the market to produce home capital, this model nonetheless suggests that an increase
in inﬂation adversely aﬀects employment and output to a greater extent than is predicted
by the standard model without home production. This response is accompanied by an
signiﬁcant increase in measured welfare costs of inﬂation.4 The magnitude ofthis response
is highly sensitive to the intratemporal elasticity ofsubstitution between capital and labor
in home production, and much less sensitive to the intratemporal elasticity ofsubstitution
between home and market consumption in establishing period utility.
A ﬁnal version ofthe model is examined in which households must ﬁnance their gross
investment in home capital goods with borrowings from the ﬁnancial intermediary. This
credit market friction causes inﬂation to act as an indirect tax on home production. As a
consequence, there is a counter-tendency ofhigher inﬂation to discourage the withdrawal
of resources from the market for use in home production, and this factor tends to mitigate
the adverse eﬀect that is otherwise observed on employment and output, while at the same
time reducing welfare.
The home production model where households face ﬁnancing constraints on gross
investment in home capital goods is developed in Section II. In Section III, alternative
subsets ofthis model and their calibrations are presented. These versions ofthe model are
used to examine the importance that various features of the model relating to ﬁnancial
market frictions and home production have separately on both the incidence and the welfare
costs ofinﬂation. The distortions created by inﬂation, and their attendant welf are costs,
in the alternative versions ofthe model are described in Section IV. They suggest that
both the credit market frictions and the inclusion of home production increase the welfare
costs ofanticipated inﬂation, and that these costs may be substantially higher than has
been previously estimated. Section V concludes.
4 McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997) have found a similar large increase in the
welfare costs of capital and labor income taxes when home production is explicitly modeled.
3II. A Monetary Home Production Model
This section develops a monetary model in which households derive utility from leisure
and from consumption goods, some of which are purchased in the market and some of
which are produced at home. There is a ﬁnancial intermediary (often referred to as a
bank) that raises funds in part by issuing bonds, and in part by oﬀering liquid demand
deposit accounts to households. Households use the deposit accounts along with currency
holdings to make consumption purchases. Gross investment by households in home capital
goods requires ﬁnancing with bank loans. Time is allocated either to market production,
home production, or leisure. Firms rent capital and labor services from the households and
ﬁnance this working capital with bank loans. Therefore, the credit market frictions that
are examined in this paper consist ofﬁnancing constraints on households’ gross investment
in home capital goods and on ﬁrms’ working capital expenses. To model these frictions,
ﬁrms and households are required to obtain funds for these expenditures by taking out
loans with a ﬁnancial intermediary at the beginning ofthe period. These loans are then
repaid at the end ofthe period when all ﬁnancial markets clear.
1. The household sector
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility, where period utility is de-
rived from leisure, nl
t, and from an aggregation of home consumption, ch
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where: C :  2
+ →  + is the consumption aggregator function that is continuous, and
continuously-diﬀerentiable in each ofits arguments.
The household makes optimal consumption/savings, capital investment, time allo-
cation, and ﬁnancial asset portfolio allocation decisions given by sequences for home and




t , time spent in home production, nh
t , leisure, and the choice ofmoney, Md
t+1,d e p o s i t s ,
4Dd
t+1, and bonds, Bd
t+1 to carry forward to the next period. It also selects the size of the























t),β ∈ (0,1) (2)
where: U :  2
+ → is the current period utility function that is continuous and continu-
ously-diﬀerentiable and concave in each ofits arguments, and β is the household’s discount
factor.
The household’s budget constraint is given by:
Pt[cm
t + km
t+1 − (1 − δ)km
t + kh



















t ,δ ∈ (0,1) (3)
Sources include: labor income, Wtnm
t ,w h e r eWt is the nominal wage rate; capital income,
Ptrk
t km
t ,w h e r ePt is the goods price, and rk
t is the real rental rate; initial money balances;
principal and interest on bank deposits, (1+rd
t)Dd
t,w h e r erd
t is the deposit rate; principal
and interest on bonds, (1 + rb
t)Bd
t ,w h e r erb
t is the bond rate; the nominal value ofloans
taken out from the ﬁnancial intermediary, Xd




t . Uses are for: nominal consumption and nominal capital investment ex-
penditures, Pt[cm
t + km
t+1 − (1 − δ)km
t + kh
t+1 − (1 − δ)kh
t ], where both capital stocks are




and repayment ofprinciple and interest on the loans, (1 + rl
t)Xd
t .
Nominal consumption purchases are made in accordance with a payment system tech-
nology in which the nominal value ofthe transactions is constrained by the liquidity avail-
able to the household through its money and deposit holdings at the beginning ofthe
period. The speciﬁcation ofthis technology is intended to allow f or substitutability be-
tween money and deposits as media ofexchange, while providing a liquidity value to both
assets.
5Ptcm
t ≤ ˜ G(Md
t ,D d
t)( 4 )
where ˜ G :  2
+ →  + is the payment system technology function that is increasing and
concave in each ofits arguments, and homogeneous ofdegree one in Md
t and Dd
t.
The level ofhome consumption cannot exceed production within the period. The
quantity produced is determined by the home production technology, where home capital





where H :  2
+ →  + is the home production function that is continuous, continuously-
diﬀerentiable, and concave in each ofits arguments. Gross investment in home capital
must be ﬁnanced by borrowing from the ﬁnancial intermediary.
Pt[kh
t+1 − (1 − δ)kh
t ] ≤ Xd
t (6)
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2. Recursive representation of the household optimization problem
To set up the problem recursively, the model is ﬁrst rendered stationary by normalizing
nominal variables on bank reserves, whose growth is a source ofnonstationarity in the
model, and whose role is described more fully below. Let Zt be the nominal supply of
bank reserves, and assume that monetary policy is conducted by selecting a rule that
governs the growth rate ofnominal bank reserves.
6Zt+1 = µZt,µ > β∀t (8)
where µ is the gross growth rate ofbank reserves.
For simplicity, drop the time subscripts and use the prime ( ) notation to signify next
period’s values. Deﬁne the following set of normalized variables: p ≡ P/Z,w ≡ W/Z,md ≡
Md/Z, dd ≡ Dd/Z, bd ≡ Bd/Z, xd ≡ Xd/Z, πf ≡ Πf/Z, and πcb ≡ Πcb/Z. Also deﬁne
the household’s state vector as s =[ km,h h,m d,d d,b d,S], where S is the aggregate state
vector described below. Let v(s) denote the household’s value function. The dynamic
programming problem becomes:






where the vector ofhousehold decision rules is given by γ(s) ≡ [ca(s),c m(s),c h(s),k m (s),
kh (s),n m(s),n h(s),n l(s),m d (s),d d (s),b d (s),x d(s)] and Γ(s) is the feasible set of deci-
sion rules deﬁned by the following set of normalized constraints, (10)-(15).
ca = C(ch,c m) (10)
p[km  − (1 − δ)km + kh 




≤ wnm + prkkm + md +( 1+rd)dd +( 1+rb)bd + xd + πf + πcb (11)
pcm ≤ G(md,d d) (12)
ch ≤ H(kh,n h) (13)
p[kh 
− (1 − δ)kh] ≤ xd (14)
7nm + nh + nl ≤ 1 (15)
where G(md,d d) ≡ ˜ G(Md,D d)/Z due to its homogeneity properties.
The Euler equations for this model are given below, where the subscripts on the
functions U,C,H, and G denote partial derivatives.
β
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Unl = UcaCchHnh (21)
Equations (16) through (20) are eﬃciency conditions that have the interpretation that
the marginal cost to the household, say, ofreducing home production time by one unit in
the current period in order to increase market production time, is just equal to the marginal
beneﬁt, when the additional labor income from the current period is carried forward in the
form of market capital, equation (16), home capital, equation (17), money, equation (18),
deposits, equation (19), and bonds, equation (20). Equation (21) is the marginal decision
to allocate nonmarket time between homework and leisure.
3. The ﬁrm sector
The ﬁrm sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive and is modeled as a single
aggregate ﬁrm that maximizes per capita proﬁts, denoted Π
f
t , period-by-period. The ﬁrm
8owns the production technology, chooses the per capita quantities off actor inputs ofmarket
capital, kmd
t ,a n dl a b o r ,nmd
t , and the amount of per capita loans, V d
t , that it obtains from
the ﬁnancial intermediary to ﬁnance its working capital. These loans are taken out at the
beginning ofthe period and are repaid at the end ofthe period.









where period proﬁts are given by revenues, Ptyt,w i t hyt denoting the ﬁrm’s per capita





t = Ptyt − (1 + rl
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where F :  2
+ →  + is the production function that is continuous, continuously-diﬀeren-
tiable, and concave in each ofits arguments.




t ≤ V d
t
or after normalization, and dropping time subscripts,
wnmd + prkkmd ≤ vd (25)
where wnmd the ﬁrm’s normalized wage bill and prkkmd is the ﬁrm’s normalized rental
payments on capital, with normalized bank loans deﬁned by vd ≡ V d/Z.
The ﬁrst-order conditions to the ﬁrm’s optimization problem can be written as follows:
rk(1 + rl)=Fkmd (26)
9(w/p)(1 + rl)=Fnmd (27)
Equations (26) and (27) represents the optimal marginal factor employment decisions of
the ﬁrm. Given the ﬁnancing constraint, the return to an additional unit ofmarket capital,
on the right hand side ofequation (26), must equal the marginal cost, on the lef t-hand
side ofequation (26), that is adjusted f or the cost ofﬁnancing. Equation (27) is a similar
eﬃciency condition for labor.
4. The ﬁnancial intermediary
The ﬁnancial sector is assumed to be competitive and represented by a single, aggre-
gate ﬁnancial intermediary that accepts deposits, issues bonds, receives reserves injections
from the monetary authorities, and makes loans both to households and to ﬁrms. It







t is the bank’s demand for per capita reserves, Lt is the total volume of per capita
bank loans, Dt is the quantity of per capita bank deposits supplied to households, Bt is
the bank’s supply ofbonds, and Π cb





t)Lt − (1 + rd
t)Dt − ξlLt − ξdDt − (1 + rb)Bt,ξ l,ξd > 0 (29)
The parameters ξl and ξd represent the marginal cost ofservicing loans and deposits.
Each period the bank must meet reserve requirements on deposit balances, or:
Zd
t ≥ ζDd
t,ζ ∈ (0,1) (30)
where ζ is the reserve requirement ratio, and satisfy its balance sheet constraint:
Zd
t + Lt ≤ Dt + Bt (31)
10Deﬁne the following normalized variables after dropping the time subscripts: zd ≡ Zd/Z,
l ≡ L/A,d ≡ D/Z, and b ≡ B/Z. Then equations (30) and (31) become:
z
d ≥ ζd (32)
and
zd + l ≤ d + b (33)
The optimal balance sheet choices must be consistent with the following interest rate
spreads (after dropping time subscripts):
1+rd + ξd = ζ +( 1− ζ)(1 + rb) (34)
rb = rl − ξl (35)
Equation (34) equates the marginal cost off unds to the bank between deposits and bonds.
Equation (35) equates the marginal cost ofacquiring, say, one dollar off unds raised by
issuing bonds, with the return from lending out that dollar.
5. Equilibrium
To deﬁne an equilibrium for this economy, let the aggregate state vector be de-







(S), ˜ d (S),˜ b (S), ˜ x(S)]
and Ωa(S) ≡ [kmd(S),n md(S),zd(S),l(S)], and the aggregate laws ofmotion that govern
the evolution ofthe aggregate economy deﬁned as Φ( S) ≡ [Kh 
(S),Km (S),m  (S),d  (S),
b (S)].
A recursive competitive equilibrium is deﬁned by the set ofhousehold decision rules, γ(s),
the set ofaggregate decision rules, Ω h(S)a n dΩ a(S), and aggregate laws ofmotion, Φ( S),
the aggregate pricing functions, p(S),w(S),r d(S),r l(S),r b(S), the monetary policy rule,
equation (8), and the value function, v(s), that are consistent with:
11(i) (household optimization): equations (16)-(21), given the constraints on: the consump-
tion aggregation, equation (10), the payment system, equation (12), the home production
technology, equation (13), the household’s ﬁnancing ofgross investment in home capital,
equation (14), and time, equation (15);
(ii) (ﬁrm optimization): equations (26) and (27), given the working capital ﬁnancing con-
straint, equation (25);
(iii) (ﬁnancial intermediary optimization): equations (34) and (35), given reserve require-
ments, equation (32), and the balance sheet constraint, equation (33);
(iv) (aggregate consistency conditions): γ(s)=Ω h(S); and
(v) (equilibrium conditions): in the markets for: labor, ˜ nm = nmd ≡ Nm; market capital,
˜ km = kmd ≡ Km;m o n e y ,˜ md = m;d e p o s i t s ,˜ dd = d; bonds, ˜ bd = b; and the following
numbered equations for bank reserves, bank loans, and goods, respectively:
zd(S) = 1 (36)
˜ x(S)+vd(S)=l(S) (37)
Cm(S)+Kh 
(S) − (1 − δ)Kh + Km (S) − (1 − δ)Km = F[Km,n md(S)] (38)
III. Calibration of Alternative Steady-state Versions of the Model
The theoretical model developed in the previous section can be thought to embed four
diﬀerent models with diﬀerent sets of features relating to credit frictions that could aﬀect
the incidence and welfare costs of anticipated inﬂation. From the simplest version to the
most complex, these models include: (1) cash-in-advance, with a ﬁnancing constraint on
working capital expenses for ﬁrms via direct lending from household to ﬁrms in a bond
market; (2) a payment system that includes deposits as a medium ofexchange, and a
ﬁnancial intermediary that engages in asset transformation and provides working capital
12loans to ﬁrms; (3) same as (2), but with households engaging in home production; and (4)
same (3), but with households required to ﬁnance their gross investment in home capital
with loans from the ﬁnancial intermediary. This section describes the steady-state versions
of these four models and the calibration procedures used for each, beginning with the full
model, version (4), that is described in section II.
1. Data
With the exceptions noted below, the four models were calibrated using annual data
from 1960-1998, where the initial date is chosen due to limitations on the availability
ofmonetary data, and the latter date is due to limitations on the availability ofcapital
stock data. For some ofthe calibrated values noted below, bank call report data on
consumer loans and commercial and industrial (C&I) loans were used. These time series
begin in 1976. The information used to compute the ratio of bank to nonbank credit for
working capital ﬁnance was taken from the Quarterly Financial Reports for Manufacturing
Companies, 1980. The deposit rate data is taken from the Federal Reserve’s estimate of a
weighted-average rate ofreturn on liquid bank deposit accounts (OMS rate) f or 1973-1999.
The capital stock data was taken from the Survey of Current Business, 1999.A l l o t h e r
data were extracted from the Federal Reserve’s FAME database.
2. Steady-state version of the home production model
The model described above consists oftwenty-one equations, (10),(12)-(21),(25)-(27),
and (32)-(38), that can be solved in the steady state for the following twenty-one variables:
Ca,Ch,Cm,Nh,Nm,Nl,Kh,Km,p,w,r k,r d,r b,r l,m,d,b,˜ x, v, l and zd. The steady-state
version ofthe model is given below:
Ca = C(Ch,Cm)( 1 .1)
pCm = G(m,d)( 1 .2)
Ch = H(Kh,n h)( 1 .3)




l =1 ( 1 .5)
β[rk 
+( 1− δ)] = 1 (1.6)










= µ/β − (1 + rd)( 1 .9)
β(1 + rb)=µ (1.10)
Unl = UcaCchHnh (1.11)
wNm + prkKm = v (1.12)
rk(1 + rl)=Fkm (1.13)
(w/p)(1 + rl)=Fnm (1.14)
zd = ζd (1.15)
zd + l = d + b (1.16)
1+rd + ξd = ζ +( 1− ζ)(1 + rb)( 1 .17)
rb = rl − ξl (1.18)
zd =1 ( 1 .19)
˜ x + v = l (1.20)
14Cm + δKh + δKm = F[Km,Nm]( 1 .21)
To calibrate the model, functional forms have been selected for the utility function,
U, the consumption aggregator, C, the payment system technology, G, home production,
H, and market production, F. Following Behabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991) and
McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997), utility is assumed to be a (log-linear) function
ofleisure and an aggregation ofhome and market consumption.
U(Nl,Ca)=ηlnNl +l nCa,η > 0 (40)
where the following CES aggregator function is used to obtain Ca.
C(Ch,Cm)=

γCmθ +( 1− γ)Chθ1/θ
,γ ∈ (0,1),θ > 0 (41)
The payment system technology is Cobb-Douglas in normalized money and deposits.
G(m,d)=g0mg1d(1−g1),g 0 > 0,g 1 ∈ (0,1) (42)
Home production is also characterized by a CES function, or constant elasticity of factor





,α 1 ∈ (0,1),λ > 0 (43)
Market production is Cobb-Douglas in market capital and labor.
F(Km,Nm)=A(Km)α2(Nm)(1−α2),A > 0,α 2 ∈ (0,1) (44)
In total, there are fourteen parameters in the model: g0,g 1,θ,γ,α 1,A,α 2,λ,δ,β,η,ζ,
ξl, and ξd; in addition to the policy parameter describing the gross growth rate ofbank
reserves, µ. Therefore, to calibrate the model, ﬁfteen constraints are needed. To facilitate
comparison with the literature on the welfare costs of inﬂation, a quarterly calibration is
used.3 In general, the procedure outlined in Cooley and Prescott (1995) is followed with
3 As noted by Cooley and Hansen (1989), the welfare costs can increase signiﬁcantly
when the length a “period” in the model increases.
15the exception ofdeﬁning the capital stocks. In this model, market capital is deﬁned as
stocks ofproducer durables, structures, and inventories, and home capital is deﬁned as the
stocks ofconsumer durables and housing.
In accordance with this procedure and these deﬁnitions, the data support a market
capital to quarterly output ratio of Km/y =5 .177, a factor share on market capital
in market production of α2 =0 .317, and a ratio ofhome capital to market capital of
Kh/Km =1 .083. The fraction of time allocated to market activity is set to Nm =0 .32,
and to home production is set to Nl =0 .25, which are consistent with the survey data
discussed by Juster and Staﬀord (1991). The two key home production parameters that
determine the substitution elasticities between home and market consumption, θ,a n d
between capital and labor in home production, λ, are initially selected on the basis ofpoint
estimates obtained by McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997). They report two sets of
estimates: θ =0 .429,λ=0 .0189 and θ =0 .326,λ=0 .269, where the latter are based on
regressions using HP-ﬁltered data. For the benchmark model, the following intermediate
values are chosen: θ =0 .385 and λ =0 .2. Sensitivity analysis is then performed over the
ranges θ,λ ∈ [0.2,0.8]. Finally, the scale parameter in production, A, is set to one.
From the ﬁnancial data, total loans are deﬁned to be the sum ofconsumer loans and
C&I loans in banks plus mortgages (on 1-to-4 family residences) plus nonbank sources of
working capital ﬁnance, where the last ofthese is determined f rom the ratio ofbank to
nonbank sources ofshort-term lending to ﬁrms. Using this deﬁnition, the ratio oftotal
transaction deposits (OCDs+DDAs) to total loans is d/l =0 .1855. The currency-deposit
ratio is m/d =0 .365. In the model, the steady-state inﬂation rate is equal to the rate
ofgrowth ofbank reserves. Since the distortions that the model is examining are due to
inﬂation, the gross quarterly growth rate ofbank reserves is set equal to µ =1 .00995 to
correspond to the actual mean annual CPI inﬂation rate of3.98 percent. It is noteworthy
that this ﬁgure is very close to the actual annual growth rate ofbank reserves, which is
3.61 percent. The reserve requirement ratio is set to the current value for transaction
deposits of ζ =0 .1. The average deposit rate is rd =4 .721 percent, the average bond
rate, taken to be the 90-day commercial paper rate, is rb =8 .38 percent, and the average
bank loan rate, taken to be the prime lending rate, is rl =9 .403 percent, where all of
16these rates are annualized. The remaining parameter values for this model compute to:
g0 =3 .246,g 1 =0 .455,η=0 .669,γ =0 .415,β =0 .9892,α 1 =0 .2763,δ =0 .0493,ξs =
0.0071,ξl =0 .0026. It is noted here that in choosing the point estimates for θ and λ that
are within the range reported by McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997), the calibrated
values of γ =0 .415 and α1 =0 .2763 are also close to their estimates of: γ =0 .414 and
α1 =0 .206 and γ =0 .412 and α1 =0 .140.
3. Alternative versions of the model
In model version (3), bank ﬁnancing ofgross investment in home capital is not re-
quired. The steady-state version ofthe model given by equations (1.1) to (1.21) above is
modiﬁed by deleting the ﬁnancing constraint, equation (1.4), and setting ˜ x =0i ne q u a t i o n
(1.20), implying that all intermediated loans are to ﬁrms for working capital expenses. The
Euler equation (1.7) is also modiﬁed by deleting the term (1+rl) to remove the distortion
associated with the ﬁnancing constraint. It becomes:
[1 − β(1 − δ)]Hnh = β(w/p)Hkh (1.6v3)
The elimination ofhousehold ﬁnancing requirements implies that total loans in the cali-
bration needs to be redeﬁned to exclude consumer loans and mortgages, which corresponds
to d/l =0 .6438. This modiﬁcation necessitates changes for the following parameter values
for version (3): g0 =0 .935,η=0 .6683,γ=0 .4203,α 1 =0 .217.
For version (2), home production is eliminated. This requires the following additional
changes to the (1.1) to (1.21). Equations (1.3), (1.7), and (1.11) are dropped. The variable
labeled Nh is now set to zero, and the utility function is assumed to be log-linear in market
consumption and leisure, or U(Cm,Nl)=l nCm + η lnNl,η > 0. The Euler equations










= µ/β − (1 + rd)( 1 .9v2)
17With the technology parameter for home production, α1, no longer appearing in the model,
the set ofparameters becomes: g0 =1 .896 and η =1 .8737, with g1,β,α 2,A,δ,ζ,ξd,ξl,
and, ofcourse, µ unchanged.
For version (1), the ﬁnancial intermediary is eliminated and the model is a simple cash-
in-advance economy with a corporate bond market that ﬁrms use to ﬁnance working capital
expenses. Relative to version (3), this model requires that equation (1.1) be replaced with
the standard cash-in-advance constraint (in equilibrium):
pCm =1 ( 1 .2v1)
and the Euler equations (1.8v2) and (1.9v2) be replaced with a single Euler equation
associated with m  since deposits d are dropped from the model.
[Ucm/Unh](w/p)=µ/β (1.8v1)
With households lending directly to ﬁrms, the volume ofworking capital loans, v,i sr e -
placed by the stock ofbonds issued, b, and the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing constraint is modiﬁed
accordingly.
wNm + prkKm = b (1.12v1)
In addition, the interest rate distortion in the ﬁrst-order conditions relating to the ﬁrm’s
factor employment decisions is now the bond rate, rb, rather than the bank loan rate, rl.
rk(1 + rb)=FKm (1.13v1)
(w/p)(1 + rb)=FNm (1.14v1)
Finally, the portion ofthe model that describes the role ofthe ﬁnancial intermediary is
eliminated, and equations (1.15) through (1.20) are dropped. The parameter values for
version (1) are: η =1 .876, and β,α2,A,and δ, all ofwhich remain unchanged, as does µ,
which now represents the gross growth rate ofthe nominal money supply, M /M.
18IV. Results
This section reports results on the incidence and welfare costs of inﬂation associated with
each ofthe f our versions ofthe model. These results are contrasted to illustrate the
separate eﬀects ofcredit market f rictions, the role played by the ﬁnancial intermediary,
and home production on the models’ predictions ofthe consequences ofhigher steady-state
inﬂation. Ofparticular interest is how inﬂation aﬀects the observable quantities ofmarket
employment and market output, and their relationship to welfare. Version (1) illustrates
that the working capital ﬁnancing constraint on ﬁrms signiﬁcantly magniﬁes the adverse
consequences that inﬂation has on employment and output, and results in a substantial
increase in the welf are costs ofinﬂation. In version (2), the introduction ofa ﬁnancial
intermediary into the model is shown to mitigate these eﬀects, owing to the fact that
much ofthe endogenous adjustment to higher inﬂation takes place in the payments system
and the ﬁnancial markets rather than in the labor market. Version (3) describes how the
inclusion ofhome production in the model induces much sharper declines in employment
and output and much greater welfare losses as inﬂation increases than would otherwise be
the case. In version (4), the ﬁnancing requirement for gross investment in home capital is
shown to mitigate the eﬀect on employment and output, since inﬂation acts in part as a
tax on home production, thus providing a disincentive to pull resources from the market
for use at home. However, welfare unambiguously declines as a result of the ﬁnancing
constraint.
1. Cash-in-advance model with a ﬁrm ﬁnancing constraint
Table 1 reports the steady-state results from version (1) of the model for the eﬀects
that inﬂation has on employment, output, and welfare. The various levels of inﬂation are
listed in the ﬁrst column, where it is seen to range from -2 percent to 20 percent, with the
calibrated value of3.98 percent used f or each subsequent version ofthe model. Version
(1) is the cash-in-advance model with a ﬁnancing constraint imposed on ﬁrms, where the
inﬂation tax directly distorts two decisions. Households’ nominal consumption purchases
are taxed, and they therefore choose to reduce consumption. This induces a loss of utility
19that the household can partially oﬀset by increasing leisure. Consequently, employment
and output fall. This is exactly the distortion examined by Cooley and Hansen (1989).
The second eﬀect is to raise the marginal cost to ﬁrms ofemploying both capital and labor
due to the ﬁnancing constraint, thus requiring a higher marginal product from each factor,
which again leads to a decline in employment and output. These joint eﬀects are illustrated
in the second and third columns ofTable 1, where percent changes in market employment
and market output relative to their calibrated steady-state values are tabulated. By way of
comparison, the reductions in employment and output associated with a change from stable
prices (zero inﬂation) to a ten percent inﬂation rate, as reported in the bottom row ofTable
1, are 3.92 percent and 5.06 percent respectively. These numbers are signiﬁcantly larger
than those reported in Cooley and Hansen (1989, Table 2), where the employment decline
is 2.35 percent and the fall in output is 2.45 percent. Welfare losses are reported in the last
column. They imply a welfare loss measured to be equivalent to a 0.803 percent decline
in steady-state consumption. This number is signiﬁcantly larger than the 0.376 percent
ﬁgure reported in Cooley and Hansen (1989). These results illustrate the importance of
the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing constraint on the distortionary eﬀects ofanticipated inﬂation. Note
that in order to f acilitate comparison, the results ofconducting this exercise ofincreasing
the inﬂation rate from zero to ten percent for each version of the model are collected in
the Summary Table (Table 7).
[Insert Table 1]
2. The role of the ﬁnancial intermediary
In version (2), a ﬁnancial intermediary is added to the model. In this case, the same
distortionary channels described above are operative. The important diﬀerence is that in
version (2), the ﬁnancial intermediary engages in asset transformation by creating deposit
accounts with a high liquidity value and uses the proceeds to ﬁnance in part the working
capital loans to ﬁrms. In this case, the distortion in the households’ consumption-savings
decision is mitigated somewhat by an endogenous adjustment in the payments system,
whereby households switch the composition oftheir media ofexchange away f rom money
20and toward deposits, with the interest income received on their deposit accounts partially
insulating them from inﬂation. In response, the ﬁnancial intermediary relies more heavily
on deposits versus bonds as a source off unds. These results are illustrated in Table 2. In
column 5, the shift toward deposits and away from money as inﬂation increases is evident
in the falling currency-deposit ratio as you move down the table. Again, use the zero to ten
percent inﬂation regimes for comparison, with the changes displayed on the bottom row
ofthe table, and repeated in the Summary Table (Table 7). In comparison with results
from version (1), columns 2 and 3 illustrate that there are lesser adverse eﬀects on market
employment, which now falls by 2.89 percent, and market output, which declines by 4.03
percent in response to an increase of inﬂation from zero to ten percent. The welfare losses
are also seen to be smaller, where in column 4 they correspond to a reduction in steady-
state consumption of 0.662 percent. Therefore, explicitly accounting for the valued asset
transformation activity performed by the ﬁnancial intermediary can reduce the welfare
costs ofinﬂation on the order of20 percent. 4
[Insert Table 2]
3. Home production.
The next comparison is between version (2) and version (3), where the latter adds a
home production technology given by equation (43) with preferences described by equations
(40) and (41). The distortion in the ﬁrm’s factor employment decisions due to the eﬀect of
inﬂation on the ﬁnancing constraint remains. Likewise, as inﬂation increases, households
adjust their composition ofthe media ofexchange in order to increase the velocity of
money. However, when households also choose to avoid the inﬂation tax that is imposed
on their nominal consumption purchases, they do not simply withdraw labor services to
increase leisure, but they may also choose to reallocate a portion oftheir non-market time
toward increasing the production ofhome consumption goods. An added complication is
that while they would like to pull resources out ofthe market since market activities are
4 A similar result is also obtained in Marquis (1999).
21being taxed, they are constrained somewhat by the need to acquire home capital for home
production, and this home capital is produced in the market.
Table 3 illustrates the optimal capital and labor resource allocation decisions in re-
sponse to higher steady-state inﬂation. Progressing down the table in columns 2 through
4, higher inﬂation is seen to induce a reallocation oftime away f rom employment in the
market and toward both homework and leisure, with a greater increase in the former.
The disproportionate increase in homework is attributable in part to the fact that market
output has declined, as indicated in column 5, and this reduces the production ofboth
market and home capital. Thus, the increase in homework is partly oﬀsetting the decline
in home capital in home production, which has consequently become more labor-intensive.
However, as indicated in columns 6 through 8, there is a greater decline in market capital
than in home capital, such that the ratio ofhome to market capital increases monotonically
with inﬂation.
[Insert Table 3]
Quantitatively, the declines in the observables ofemployment and output that are
illustrated in Table 3 are much higher than those reported in Table 2 for the version of
the model that did not explicitly account for home production. Once again using the
zero to ten percent comparison, the bottom row ofTable 3, and repeated in the Summary
Table (Table 7), indicates that the addition ofthe home production sector to the model
increases the predicted employment decline to 3.99 percent from 2.89 percent, while output
is projected to decline by 5.13 percent versus 4.03 percent.
Table 4 portrays how the responses to inﬂation reduce welfare. From columns 2
through 4, it is evident that higher inﬂation causes the household to experience a utility
loss from the decline in market consumption, that is partially oﬀset by an increase in home
consumption. However, on balance the household experiences less utility from consumption
over all, as indicated in column 4, and more utility from leisure, column 5, with the loss
in consumption dominating and welfare declining, column 6. Quantitatively, this decline
in welfare is much greater than in version (2) where there was no home production sector.
From the bottom row ofthe table [and repeated in the Summary Table (Table 7)], the
22increase of inﬂation from zero to ten percent is seen to cause welfare to fall by 1.545 percent,
which is more than double the 0.662 percent decline in version (2).
[Insert Table 4]
4. Home production with a household ﬁnancing constraint.
The additional eﬀect that forcing households to ﬁnance their gross investment in home
capital with bank loans is examined by comparing versions (3) and (4) ofthe model. The
distortions associated with higher inﬂation are identical in the two versions, except that
the marginal cost ofacquiring home capital is greater in version (4). This eﬀectively taxes
home production, and tends to divert resources away from that activity. Refer to Table
5. As in version (3), columns 2 through 4 indicate that employment falls while homework
and leisure increase with inﬂation. However, when compared with Table 3, this decline
in employment is somewhat muted, implying that there is less additional nonmarket time
for the household to allocate between homework and leisure. Even so, relative to version
3, households choose to increase leisure to a greater extent, column 3, thus lessening the
increase in homework, column 2. The rationale for this allocation of nonmarket time is
that inﬂation increases the cost ofﬁnancing investment in home capital, thereby requiring
a higher marginal product ofcapital, which in turn results in a much lower steady-state
stock ofhome capital, which is seen by comparing columns 6 in Tables 3 and 5, thus
reducing the marginal product ofhomework.
[Insert Table 5]
From Table 6, it is evident that households respond to higher inﬂation by reducing
market consumption, column 2, much less when the home ﬁnancing constraint is present.
As a consequence, the determinants of household utility (welfare) is shifting away from
home consumption, and toward market consumption and leisure as a result ofthis credit
friction. Unlike version (3), this eﬀect is strong enough under this calibration to induce
an outright decline in home production, column 2, and this decline more than oﬀsets in
23the contribution ofa lesser decline in higher market consumption, column 3, in the overall
aggregate consumption measure, column 4.
[Insert Table 6]
To summarize these results quantitatively, the observables ofemployment and market
output are less adversely aﬀected by inﬂation in the home production model when the
household ﬁnancing constraint is present in the model. For the zero to ten percent inﬂation
case, market employment falls by 3.78 percent, as shown in column 2 of Table 6, and
repeated in the Summary Table (Table 7), and output declines by 4.91 percent. However,
the welfare losses are noticeably greater, with the welfare measure corresponding to a 1.921
percent reduction in consumption, or a 24 percent increase over version (3).
[Insert Table 7]
5. Sensitivity analysis with respect to the home production parameters.
There are two key parameters in the home production sector that could signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the household resource allocation decisions. One is θ in the consumption aggregator
function that determines the elasticity of substitution between home and market consump-
tion, and the second is λ in the home production technology that determines the elasticity
ofsubstitution between in home capital and homework. Sensitivity analysis is conducted
on version (4) of the model for the range of values for θ,λ ∈ [0.2,0.8], with the results for
percent changes in employment and output, along with the welfare costs, associated with
an increase ofthe inﬂation rate f rom zero to ten percent, tabulated in Table 8.
[Insert Table 8]
In choosing θ, the calibration ofthe model yields a value f or γ, the share parameter
in the consumption aggregator. Similarly, λ and α1 cannot be separately chosen. Higher
values of θ correspond to higher values of γ, while higher values of λ coincide with lower
values of α1. By observing the results in any given column in Table 8, it is evident that the
elasticity ofsubstitution between home consumption and market consumption has a greater
24eﬀect on the employment and output responses to inﬂation than on the welfare losses. For
example, from column 1, raising θ from the benchmark value of 0.385 (γ =0 .415) to 0.8
(γ =0 .482) ampliﬁes the employment decline from 3.78 percent to 5.43 percent, while the
output decline increases from 4.91 percent to 6.56 percent. However, because of the high
degree ofsubstitutability between home and market consumption in their determination
of household utility, the welfare losses rise only from 1.921 percent to 1.944 percent.
By contrast, as can be seen from any one row in Table 8, the elasticity ofsubstitution
between home capital and homework in home production has a very large eﬀect not only on
employment and output, but also on welfare. From the second row of models, a comparison
ofthe results obtained f rom the benchmark model in the ﬁrst column with λ =0 .2( α1 =
0.276) and the calibration ofthe model with the higher elasticity ofsubstitution [used
by Greenwood and Hercowitz, (1991)] in column ﬁve of λ =0 .8( α1 =0 .069), there are
sharp declines in employment, from 3.78 percent to 9.41 percent, and in output, from 4.91
percent to 10.53 percent. The welfare costs are seen to rise from 1.921 percent reduction
in market consumption to 4.979 percent, which is approximately a 150 percent increase.
In summary, these results imply that ifeither the elasticity ofsubstitution in consumption
or the elasticity ofsubstitution in home production are higher than the estimates reported
in McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997), then the welfare costs of inﬂation will rise.
However, the more critical parameter is related to production rather than to preferences.
V. Conclusions
The early literature on the welfare costs of inﬂation concluded that these costs are signif-
icant, but modest when the only distortion is through a payment system constraint such
as cash-in-advance, where ﬁnancial assets alone are used to facilitate transactions. One
purpose ofthis paper is to examine how these welf are costs are aﬀected by an additional
ﬁnancial market friction in the form of a ﬁnancing constraint imposed on ﬁrms who must
borrow to ﬁnance their working capital expenses, and where those loans must be repaid
with current sales revenues. The model suggests that this can signiﬁcantly increase the
welfare costs of inﬂation. However, when explicitly modeling ﬁnancial intermediaries, who
perform an economic function of valued asset transformation through which they create
25liquid interest-bearing deposit accounts and use the proceeds to ﬁnance, in part, the work-
ing capital loans to ﬁrms, the welfare losses are somewhat reduced. The lower welfare
losses owe to the fact that households can adjust their media of exchange in response
to higher inﬂation away from currency and toward interest-bearing deposit accounts and
thereby partially insulate themselves from the inﬂation tax. This endogenous response
in the households’ means ofpayment, in turn, mitigates the distortionary eﬀect on the
households’ factor supply decisions.
Inﬂation taxes market activity. This tax therefore induces households to withhold re-
sources from the market and engage them in economic activity at home. Explicitly model-
ing non-market activity in a home production setting exacerbates the steady-state declines
in employment and output caused by inﬂation, and raises the corresponding welfare costs.
The magnitude ofthese responses depends crucially on the elasticity ofsubstitution be-
tween home capital and homework in home production, where the employment and output
declines and the welfare losses all rise as this elasticity increases. Nonetheless, even using
the relatively low value consistent with the point estimates reported by McGrattan, Roger-
son, and Wright (1997), the results suggest that explicitly accounting for home production
activities signiﬁcantly ampliﬁes the employment and output declines induced by inﬂation,
and dramatically raises the welfare costs of inﬂation. Adding a ﬁnancing constraint on the
household’s gross investment in home capital renders the market employment and market
output less distorted in the model due to an increase in inﬂation, as resources tend to move
back into the market, but nonetheless raises welfare costs further. These results imply that
inﬂation may be more costly than previously thought.
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28Table 1
VERSION 1: CASH-IN-ADVANCE, WITH FIRM FINANCING CONSTRAINT
Inﬂation Employment Output Welfare Losses
(%, annualized) −−−−−(% change relative to steady-state) −−−−−
-2.00 2.393 3.104 -0.427
-1.00 1.987 2.576 -0.361
0.00 1.584 2.052 -0.293
3.98 0.000 0.000 0.000
10.00 -2.337 -3.005 0.510
20.00 -6.065 -7.745 1.524
0 to 10 % -3.921 -5.057 0.803
29Table 2
VERSION 2: ADDITION OF THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY
Inﬂation Employment Output Welfare Losses Currency/
(%, annualized) −− (% change relative to steady-state) −− Deposits
-2.00 1.833 2.538 -0.372 1.094
-1.00 1.506 2.090 -0.312 0.788
0.00 1.191 1.656 -0.251 0.625
3.98 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.365
10.00 -1.703 -2.374 0.411 0.247
20.00 -4.385 -6.091 1.180 0.180
0 to 10 % -2.894 -4.030 0.662
30Table 3
VERSION 3: HOME PRODUCTION: RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
Inﬂation Employ- Homework Leisure Output Capital Home/Mkt
ment Home Market Capital
(%, ann) −−−−−−−(% change relative to steady-state) −−−−−−− Ratio
-2.00 2.569 -1.725 -0.909 3.280 0.987 4.827 1.043
-1.00 2.102 -1.412 -0.743 2.690 0.846 3.969 1.051
0.00 1.657 -1.114 -0.586 2.124 0.690 3.138 1.057
3.98 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.083
10.00 -2.336 1.580 0.820 -3.003 -1.126 -4.424 1.120
20.00 -5.974 4.071 2.079 -7.652 -3.062 -11.166 1.182
0 to 10 % -3.994 2.694 1.406 -5.127 -1.816 -7.562
31Table 4
VERSION 3: HOME PRODUCTION: DETERMINANTS OF WELFARE
Inﬂation Consumption Leisure Welfare
Market Home Aggregate Losses
(%, annualized) −−−−−−−(% change relative to steady-state) −−−−−−−
-2.00 3.782 -0.670 0.925 -0.909 -0.849
-1.00 3.077 -0.533 0.763 -0.743 -0.714
0.00 2.415 -0.411 0.605 -0.586 -0.577
3.98 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10.00 -3.332 0.514 -0.887 0.820 0.968
20.00 -8.435 1.230 -2.333 2.079 2.824
0 to 10 % -5.747 1.925 -1.492 1.406 1.545
32Table 5
VERSION 4: HOME PRODUCTION/HOUSEHOLD FINANCING CONSTRAINT:
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
Inﬂation Employ- Homework Leisure Output Capital Home/Mkt
ment Home Market Capital
(%, ann) −−−−−−−(% change relative to steady-state) −−−−−−− Ratio
-2.00 2.342 -1.486 -0.879 3.051 3.133 4.595 1.068
-1.00 1.936 -1.229 -0.727 2.523 2.608 3.800 1.071
0.00 1.539 -0.977 -0.577 2.005 2.082 3.018 1.073
3.98 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.083
10.00 -2.242 1.433 0.835 -2.909 -3.074 -4.331 1.097
20.00 -5.799 3.733 2.146 -7.480 -7.951 -11.008 1.120
0 to 10 % -3.780 2.410 1.412 -4.914 -5.156 -7.349
33Table 6
VERSION 4: HOME PRODUCTION/HOUSEHOLD FINANCING CONSTRAINT:
DETERMINANTS OF WELFARE
Inﬂation Consumption Leisure Welfare
Market Home Aggregate Losses
(%, annualized) −−−−−−−(% change relative to steady-state) −−−−−−−
-2.00 2.172 0.328 0.980 -0.879 -1.074
-1.00 1.788 0.280 0.814 -0.743 -0.903
0.00 1.416 0.229 0.649 -0.577 -0.728
3.98 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10.00 -2.048 -0.377 -0.971 0.835 1.193
20.00 -5.313 -1.040 -2.570 2.146 3.413
0 to 10 % -3.464 -0.606 -1.620 1.412 1.921
34Table 7
SUMMARY TABLE OF STEADY-STATE RESULTS
% change associated with an increase in steady-state inﬂation from 0% to 10%
Employment Output Welfare Losses
Cooley-Hansen (1989), CIA Model -2.35 -2.45 0.376
VERSION 1: Add Firm
Financing Constraint -3.92 -5.06 0.803
VERSION 2: Add Financial
Intermediary -2.89 -4.03 0.662
VERSION 3: Add Home
Production -3.99 -5.13 1.545
VERSION 4: Add Household
Financing Constraint -3.78 -4.91 1.921
35Table 8
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON HOME PRODUCTION PARAMATERS λ AND θ
% change associated with an increase in steady-state inﬂation from 0% to 10%
λ (α1)
0.200(0.276) 0.385(0.187) 0.500(0.144) 0.667(0.097) 0.800(0.069)
θ =0 .200
γ 0.385 0.380 0.375 0.371 0.368
welfare losses 1.918 2.226 2.532 3.348 4.975
Nm declines 3.596 4.164 4.728 6.232 9.222
y declines 4.730 5.297 5.860 7.361 10.344
θ =0 .385
γ 0.415 0.402 0.395 0.386 0.381
welfare losses 1.921 2.229 2.535 3.352 4.979
Nm declines 3.780 4.349 4.913 6.418 9.412
y declines 4.914 5.581 6.044 7.547 10.533
θ =0 .500
γ 0.433 0.416 0.407 0.396 0.388
welfare losses 1.923 2.231 2.538 3.356 4.985
Nm declines 3.963 4.540 5.097 6.604 9.599
y declines 5.096 5.664 6.228 7.732 10.721
θ =0 .667
γ 0.460 0.437 0.425 0.410 0.400
welfare losses 1.930 2.239 2.547 3.368 5.004
Nm declines 4.451 5.022 5.588 7.099 10.103
y declines 5.583 6.152 6.717 8.226 11.223
θ =0 .800
γ 0.482 0.455 0.440 0.421 0.409
welfare losses 1.944 2.257 2.567 3.395 5.045
Nm declines 5.426 5.999 6.569 8.087 11.106
y declines 6.557 7.128 7.696 9.221 12.224
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